

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9140

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 7506

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IS, SY

SUBJECT: WALDHEIM'S TALKS IN JERUSALEM

SUMMARY: WALDHEIM TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT THE SYRIANS HAD REJECTED ALL THE PROPOSALS HE HAD MADE TO THEM. ASAD WANTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE OVER DIRECTLY THE TASK OF FINDING A SOLUTION. WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD TOLD ASAD THAT IF THERE WAS NO EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE BY SUNDAY NIGHT, THE UNDOF WOULD BE WITHDRAWN. THE ISRAELIS HAD TOLD WALDHEIM THAT THEY WOULD SUPPORT AN EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE FOR SIX MONTHS, WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SYRIANS WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTION 338, AND WOULD NOT ATTEND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IF THE PLO IS INVITED. END SUMMARY.

1. READING FROM MESSAGE WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN SENT DINITZ (AND SUBSEQUENTLY COMMUNICATED TO UNDER SECRETARY SISCO) EVRON GAVE ME FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF WALDHEIM'S TALKS HERE NOVEMBER 24 WITH FONMIN ALLON AND PRIMIN RABIN.

2. ALLON HAD BEGUN BY TAKING WALDHEIM TO TASK FOR HIS MEETING WITH ARAFAT IN DAMASCUS, POINTING OUT THAT THE ONLY PURPOSE OF THE SYG'S VISIT TO THE AREA WAS TO SECURE AN EXTENSION OF THE UNDOF MANDATE AND ADDING THAT THE TIMING WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE, COMING AS IT DID JUST TWO DAYS AFTER THE LATEST TERRORIST INCIDENT.

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WALDHEIM ADMITTED THAT THE TIMING WAS NOT GOOD BUT SAID THE

SYRIANS HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE DATE COULD NOT BE CHANGED BECAUSE ARAFAT WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE FOR MOSCOW. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS BOUND TO MEET WITH THE PLO AS A RESULT OF GA RESOLUTIONS 3236 AND 3276. ALLON TOOK EXCEPTION TO THIS STATEMENT, NOTING THAT THE GOI DOES NOT ACCEPT THESE RESOLUTIONS; FURTHERMORE, THEY ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY DIRECTIVE WHICH STATES THAT THE SYG HIMSELF MUST MEET WITH THE PLO.

3. AS TO HIS MEETING WITH ASAD, WALDHEIM SAID THAT THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAD REJECTED ALL THE PROPOSALS HE HAD BROUGHT WITH HIM: REGULAR MANDATE EXTENSION; MOVEMENT TOWARD ANOTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT; OR THE CALLING OF A PREPARATORY MEETING TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. HE HAD ALSO REJECTED THE IDEA OF SUB-COMMITTEES DEALING WITH SPECIFIC PROBLEMS, AND SPOKE FIRMLY AGAINST THE STEP-BY-STEP METHOD. HE DENOUNCED THE EGYPTIAN "BETRAYAL" AND SAID THAT PLO PARTICIPATION IS A PRE-CONDITION FOR ANY FUTURE STEP.

4. ASAD PROPOSED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKE OVER DIRECTLY THE TASK OF FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. AS A FIRST STEP, THE SC SHOULD EXTEND THE MANDATE FOR SIX MONTHS. AS A SECOND STEP, THE SC SHOULD THEN BE SEIZED WITH THE PROBLEM "AND GET DOWN TO WORK." ASAD SAID HE WANTED A RESOLUTION TO THE ABOVE EFFECT ACCEPTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE SC SHOULD SET ITSELF TWO OBJECTIVES: THE TOTAL

WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS.

5. WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. WOULD VETO ANY SUCH RESOLUTION AS ASAD PROPOSED. IF THERE WAS NO EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE BY SUNDAY NIGHT, THE UNDOF WOULD BE WITHDRAWN. TO THIS ASAD HAD REPLIED THAT THE UNDOF COULD STAY WITHOUT A MANDATE EXTENSION. (QUESTIONED ON THIS SUBSEQUENTLY, EVRON SAID THE ISRAELIS HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT IF EXTENSION WAS NOT AGREED TO, THE UNDOF WOULD BE PULLED OUT.) WALDHEIM SAID HIS CONCLUSION WAS THAT THERE WAS POOR COORDINATION BETWEEN ASAD AND ARAFAT AND HE BELIEVED THAT THE USSR WOULD SUPPORT PASSING THE PROBLEM TO THE SC.

6. ALLON EXPLAINED THAT ISRAEL WOULD SUPPORT AN EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE FOR SIX MONTHS AND WOULD GO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH SYRIA WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS AND ON THE BASIS OF
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RESOLUTION 338. HE POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS NO TIME LIMIT ON THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA; ANY LIMITATIONS TO BE INTRODUCED COULD BE INTERPRETED AS CHANGING THE AGREEMENT TO SOMETHING ELSE. THE PRESENCE OF UNDOF WAS PART AND PARCEL OF THE AGREEMENT. THE SC HAD AUTHORIZED THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TO DEAL WITH THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, AND FOR ISRAEL THAT FRAMEWORK STILL EXISTS. ISRAEL WAS READY TO PARTICIPATE AT GENEVA "WITH THE ORIGINAL PARTICIPANTS ONLY." THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT

OF AN INFORMAL MEETING WAS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT MIGHT HELP TOWARD THE RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE. ALLON CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SYRIANS, WHEN FACED WITH THE ALTERNATIVE, WOULD REFUSE AN EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE.

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EXDIS

7. IN HIS MEETING WITH RABIN, WALDHEIM BEGAN BY REPEATING WHAT HE HAD TOLD ALLON. EVRON SAID HE ADDED THE FOLLOWING POINTS; HOWEVER: (A) THE SYRIAN NEGATIVE ATTITUDE WAS FOCUSED FIRST AND FOREMOST ON THE PALESTINIAN ASPECT; (B) ASAD HAD SHOWN NO INTEREST IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE; (C) THE PROPOSAL TO PASS THE PROBLEM TO THE SC STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT THE PLO COULD THEN BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE; AND (D) ASAD WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE U.S. VETO THIS PROPOSAL, A STEP HE THOUGHT WOULD PROBABLY DESTROY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT.

8. RABIN SAID THE GOI SEES TWO DIFFERENT AND DISTINCT PROBLEMS. THE FIRST WAS THE EXTENSION OF THE AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA, OF WHICH UNDOF IS A PART. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD THE GOI AGREE TO TYING THIS EXTENSION TO ANY OTHER MATTER AND THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY STEP WHICH MAKES THE AGREEMENT "LEVERAGE FOR BLACKMAIL." THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A SHORT EXTENSION, SAY OF TWO MONTHS. THE AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA WAS UNLIMITED AND MUST REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL REPLACED BY ANOTHER AGREEMENT. THEY WOULD HOLD THE SYRIANS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION.

9. THE SECOND PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO RABIN, WAS THAT OF PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE. THE GOI WOULD AGREE TO A RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AFTER THE MANDATE IS EXTENDED AND WITH THE ORIGINAL PARTICIPANTS. IF THE PLO IS INVITED, ISRAEL WOULD NOT ATTEND. THEY REJECT THE SYRIAN PROPOSAL AND WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY CHANGE IN SECRET

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242 BY ADDING GA RESOLUTION 3236 TO IT. THERE CAN BE NO UNILATERAL MOVES OR CONCESSIONS BY THE ISRAELIS. THEY COULD AGREE TO A PEACE AGREEMENT IN WHICH EACH SIDE RECEIVED ACCEPTABLE COMPENSATION.

10. IN CLOSING, WALDHEIM TOLD RABIN THAT THE IRANIAN UNIT OF UNDOF HAD TOLD HIM THAT THEY HAD NOTICED THE MOVEMENTS OF THE TERRORISTS ON THE EVENING OF THE RAMAT MAGSHIMIM ATTACK LAST WEEK. HE ADDED THAT THE SYRIANS DID NOT DENY THAT THESE TERRORISTS HAD COME FROM SYRIA. THE PRIME MINISTER CONCLUDED BY STRESSING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THESE TERRORIST INCIDENTS, WHICH WERE VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA.

11. COMMENT: THE CHILL IN THE AIR WAS MORE THAN SEASONAL WHEN WALDHEIM CAME TO JERUSALEM, PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF HIS MEETING WITH ARAFAT IN DAMASCUS. NOTHING WALDHEIM TOLD THE ISRAELIS HAS DONE ANYTHING TO LESSEN THE PESSIMISM HERE ABOUT THE CHANCES OF A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION WITH THE SYRIANS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. CERTAINLY NOT THE "PLO-MUST-BE-IN" LINE OR THE EVIDENT DESIRE TO DESTROY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT. RABIN IS OBVIOUSLY NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT A TWO-MONTH UNDOF EXTENSION, AMONG OTHER REASONS, BECAUSE THE ISSUE WOULD THEN BE PRECIPITATED AGAIN ABOUT THE TIME OF HIS EXPECTED VISIT TO THE U.S. AS ONE LOCAL OBSERVER PUT IT: A LONG AND DIFFICULT SC SESSION SEEMS IN PROSPECT. DUNNIGAN

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